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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case: 
This is an appeal from an order by the Honorable Gregory S. Anderson granting 
Defendants Motion to Dismiss this tort action due to the death of the plaintiff. 
On May 12, 2004, plaintiff was driving her vehicle northbound on Anunon Road, in Idaho 
Falls, Idaho. At the same time, Defendant'Respondent STEVEN JOHN GELLINGS, while in 
the course and scope of his employment with Co-defendants/Respondents, was traveling 
northbound on US Highway 26. At the intersection of Anunon Road and US Highway 26, 
STEVEN JOHN GELLINGS failed to stop at the stop light controlling his direction of travel, 
proximately causing this accident and plaintiff's injuries. 
On May 4, 2006, plaintiff timely filed a complaint for damages. During the course of 
proceedings, and before trial and judgment, plaintiff died due to reasons not claimed to be accident 
related. 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition: 
After defendants received notice that the plaintiff had died, on January 25, 2008, they 
filed a Motion to Dismiss the action, alleging that, "pursuant to common law", all of an 
individual's claim for personal iajury damages do not survive the plaintiff's death. 
The matter was briefed and argued. On March 13, 2008, the Court issued an order 
dismissing plaintiff's case concluding that the common law does not support survival of any part 
of personal injury actions. 
Ill 
Ill 
This appeal followed. 
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3. Statement of Facts: 
The motor vehicle accident that is the subject of this action is described above. As a 
result of this action, plaintiff has alleged non-economic damages and economic damages 
including medical bills and substantial wage loss. Plaintiff died during the course of these 
proceedings, and the matter was dismissed in its entirety by the lower court, agreeing with 
defendants that by law plaintiffs personal injury action did not survive her death by other 
causes. 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
DOES PLAINTIFF'S PERSONAL JNJURY CLAJM, OR ANY PORTION 
THEREOF, SURVIVE HER DEATH, WHEN THAT DEATH IS NOT 
RELATED TO THE UNDERLYING ACCIDENT? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard in ruling on a Motion to Dismiss is that an action shall not be dismissed 
unless there are no facts upon which a recovery can be had. 
The "trial court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party and 
resolve all factual conflicts in favor of the non-moving party." This standard is similar as to 
other 12(b) motions. Murphy v. Schneider Nat'[ Inc., 362 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 
McNatt v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) ("favorably" viewing the pleaded facts in 
the context of a Rule 12(b )(1) (subject matter jurisdiction); Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 
1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002) The court is to take as true the allegations of the non-moving party 
and resolve all factual disputes in its favor. Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 325 
(199 I) (in the context of a Rule 12(b )( 6) motion, all material facts as pled in the complaint are 
assumed to be true.) 
Ill 
APPELLANT'S OPENJNG BRIEF 2 
ARGUMENT 
In it's order granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, the lower court relied primarily on 
the cases of Steele v. Kootenai Medical Center, 142 Idaho 919; 136 P.3d 905, (2006) and Evans 
v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210; 796 P.2d 87, (1990) for the proposition that "unless 
modified by statute, the common law is in effect in Idaho" and "Under common law, a cause of 
action for personal injuries ceased to exist upon the death of the person injured." Steele, 142 
Idaho at 920, 136 P.3d at 906. [Clerk's Record on Appeal, p. 53] The text of the Steele case 
referred to cites Doggett v. Boiler Engineering & Supply Co., 93 Idaho 888,477 P. 2d 511 
(1970) as it's authority for the above proposition that at common law all of plaintiff's claims do 
not survive the death of the plaintiff. 
Appellant respectfully contends that Doggett does not support such a blanket statement, 
and, in fact, rules otherwise. As such, the Steele court's (and, hence the lower court's) reliance is 
misplaced. 
Doggett cited with approval Publix Cab Company v. Colorado National Bank of Denver, 
338 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1959)that explained "the rule of non-survival is a vestige of the ancient 
concept of violent torts and owes its existence to historical accident and blind adherence to 
precedent."1 93 Idaho at 890. 
Publix Cab Company v. Colorado National Bank of Denver, 338 P.2d 702 (Colo. 1959) 
involved an injury on May 18, 1954, to William H. Anderson as a pedestrian on the streets of 
Denver. The Bank, as Conservator for Mr. Anderson, filed a personal injury action on 
September 16, 1954, seeking both special and general damages, including "pain and suffering." 
338 P.2d at 704. Mr. Anderson died seven months later on December 31, 1954, never having 
1 All emphasis and italics in this Brief have been added unless otherwise noted. 
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awakened from the accident-caused coma. 
The lower court held that the Bank had the right to proceed - the injury action did not 
abate. The defense appealed, arguing the claim died with Mr. Anderson under the common law 
rule of non-survivability. 
In affirming the Bank's right to proceed as a substituted party for Mr. Anderson the 
Colorado Supreme Court recognized the issue "has not received full consideration" in its 
"previous decisions." Publix then spoke to "the history of the non-survival rule as it existed at 
common law" explaining that "the non-survival rule is a vestige of the ancient concept of violent 
torts, and owes its existence to historical accident and blind adherence to precedent' - "The 
lack of historical validity of the rule that tort actions die with the person and considering the 
rule's affinity to intentional torts" was finally recognized. 338 P.2d at 707-708, 711. It further 
explained that, to the extent the "rule" had any validity at all, the rule's "historical application 
was to violent and intentional torts" and not negligence. 338 P.2d at 708. 
Other early Idaho cases recognized the survival of injury and negligence actions at 
common law. Muir v. City of Pocatello, 36 Idaho 532, 212 P2d 345,346 (1922) specifically held 
that a personal injury claim is a community property claim that does not expire upon the death of 
one spouse. 
Kloepfer v. Forch, 32 Idaho 415, 184 Pac 477,478 (1919) involved an action against a 
supplier of chemicals to treat clover pests who negligently furnished sodium arsenite rather than 
sodium arsenate and "destroyed" the plaintiff's crops. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed 
dismissal following the death of Jacob Forch despite the erroneous belief that at common law 
there was no "survival of causes of action" in negligence. 
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Careful reading of the Doggett case actually finds that the alleged "common law" rule as 
to non-survival of causes of action for tort applied to "serious intentional wrongs" and "criminal 
acts" and the tort based on the negligence of the wrongdoer was not recognized until the 19th 
century. [Doggett at 890) The Doggett Court pointed out that "it seems illogical that a rule laid 
down in the earliest common law to prevent continuation of actions in the case of violent and 
deliberate acts should be applied to acts of negligence for which no action existed until the mid-
19th century." Id Said Court cites approvingly Professor Alvin E. Evans, then Dean of the 
University of Kentucky Law School, in 29 Michigan Law Review 969, that "it is almost 
"inconceivable" that we should continue to deny survival of actions where the estate of the 
injured person has been lessened and states there should be no difference in the principles 
involved, regardless of whether intentional or negligent injuries are involved." Id. 
The Doggett Court further stated, at the bottom of page 890, that: 
"Respondent cites Norton v. City of Pomona, Cal.App., 43 P.2d 586 
(1935); Munchiando v. Bach, 203 Cal. 457,264 P. 762 (1928), and Bortle v. 
Osborne, 155 Wash. 585,285 P. 425 (1930), all as authority for the rule ofnon-
survivability of a cause of action following the death of a plaintiff. We do not 
find the "careful review of common law history" in Norton as suggested by the 
respondent." (underline added) 
The Doggett Court went on to rule in favor of the Plaintiff/ Appellant on grounds of 
community property laws, the plaintiff having been married at the time of the tort. Hence, this 
appellant contends that the reliance of the Steele court for the proposition that Doggett holds that 
at common law all claims for personal injuries abate on the death of the plaintiff is not supported. 
The Doggett Court was not required to rely on that finding, being able to correct the injustice in 
defendant's claims by relying on the community property statutes. 
In the present case, not only did the plaintiff suffer "pain and suffering" and other general 
damages from the underlying accident, but she also suffered medical bills and wage loss. 
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[Clerk's Record on Appeal, pages 6-10] Vulkv. Haley, 736 P.2d 1309, (1987) addressed pain 
and suffering. However, except for Steele, discussed above, a plaintiff's claim for economic 
damages, for example for medical bills and wage loss, have not been clearly and directly 
addressed by this Court. 
Doggett clearly left the door open for a court to rule that common law did not preclude a 
claim for economic damages by the estate of a plaintiff who died prior to judgment. The Doggett 
Court recognized the inherent inequity and manifest injustice in such a rule, and concluded as 
follows: 
"We have examined the precedents and the reasons for the rule of non· 
survivability of causes of action following the death of a plaintiff We find the 
precedents unclear and unsatisfactory and the purported reasons for the rule 
virtually non-existent. We suggest that a continuation of such a rule serves no 
purpose." Doggett, at page 892. 
Just prior to stating the above, the Doggett Court cited approvingly the following quote 
from Haney v. Lexington, 386 S.W.2d 738 (Ky.1964): 
"The reason the courts have denied their logical impulses and have 
continued to enforce an unfair rule of law is because they have been nurtured and 
sustained by another ancient and firmly fixed doctrine, that is, stare decisis et non 
quieta movere - to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle things which are 
established. But when established things are no longer secure in a fast changing 
world, the court should re-examine the precedents and determine if they provide a 
proper standing under present conditions." 
The above two quotes succinctly state the appellant's position in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
It is manifestly unjust and patently unfair that, merely because the plaintiff was 
unfortunate enough to die before her case had reached a judgment, the defendant/respondent, 
who was clearly responsible for her substantial damages, walks away with no accountability or 
responsibility for it's negligent actions. There is sufficient ambiguity in the common law that, 
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coupled with the manifest injustice in the outcome in the lower court and the lack of controlling 
statute, this appeal is justified for express clarification of the law on the issue presented. 
Plaintiff/appellant respectfully asks the Court to consider the lower court's ruling in this 
matter, and reverse it to the extent that it is not consistent with justice or early precedent, 
particularly as stated in the Doggett ruling. 
Dated: n~ I 3, GOO°'-
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